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Maximus the Confessor and John of  





For years I have been perplexed as to why Maximus the Confessor, 
in his articulate christological formulations in the seventh century, ultimately 
decided that Jesus Christ, as fully human, had only a natural human will (θέλημα 
φυσική), and so forcefully ruled against the possibility that he also had a “gnomic” 
(or “deliberative”) will (γνώμη) in the manner of fallen human beings. In the 
words of Maximus’ own beloved predecessor, Gregory Nazianzen, “what is not 
assumed is not healed.”1 Though not alone in this concern, I’ve made a regular pest 
of myself broaching this issue in numerous patristics conferences (most recently 
the 2011 Oxford Patristics Conference) anytime an essay on Maximus would 
even remotely touch on the matter. The answer I get represents a fairly hardened 
scholarly consensus. Accordingly, Maximus, in working out his understanding of 
the Chalcedonian definition, still required a certain asymmetry in the composite 
hypostasis of Christ, since it is the divine hypostasis of the Son who united with and 
divinized the humanity of Jesus. In this case only a “natural” human will could be 
truly deified, not a gnomic will prone to vacillation. 
I agree with this consensus in general, and it has been strengthened all the 
more in an excellent recent study by Ian McFarland comparing Maximus’ doctrine 
of the will with that of Augustine. McFarland has cogently argued the plausibility of 
Maximus’ denial of γνώμη in Christ as a function of his strong sense that “natural” 
human will, as modeled in Christ, is not antecedently “constrained” by the will of the 
divine Creator but a manifestation of the gracious stability of human will in concert 
with deifying divine grace. Indeed, Christ has effectively liberated human willing 
from the disastrous illusion of “autonomy” that characterizes human existence after 
the fall.2  
And yet Maximus’ ultimate denial of γνώμη in Jesus Christ came with a 
price, since γνώμη represents the freedom of the will that we fallen human beings 
actually experience, a freedom of conscience that is struggling to become conformed 
to the true “natural” freedom, or freedom-for-virtue, for which we were created. In 
my struggle to be fully satisfied with Maximus’ ultimate rejection of γνώμη in Christ, 
1  Ep. 101 (PG 37:181C).
2  Ian McFarland, “‘Naturally and by Grace: Maximus the Confessor on the Operation of the 
Will,” Scottish Journal of Theology 58 (2005): 410-33.
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I have turned to John of Damascus, who certainly revered Maximus and consistently 
deferred to his theological judgment, for possible help. 
Let me set forth in more detail the grounds for my discontent. As is well 
known from Maximus’ writings, γνώμη is a term that opened up a wide variety of 
meanings and connotations. At one point Maximus, echoed later by the Damascene, 
claimed to have discovered 28 different biblical and patristic usages of the word, 
depending on context.3 Modern lexicons confirm the word’s pliability, being 
variously translated “mind,” “will,” “purpose,” “intention,” “inclination,” “opinion,” 
“character,” and more. But specifically in the seasoned philosophical discussions 
of human freedom and volition—a broad domain in which Christian writers were 
articulating precise definitions of the human will in relation to conceptions of the 
soul’s deep-seated desire and directedness toward appropriate ends— γνώμη took on 
a somewhat more technical sense, though without initially forfeiting its semantic 
latitude. 
Drawing firsthand from Nemesius of Emesa and secondhand from 
Aristotle,4 Maximus (followed closely by John of Damascus later on5) had 
constructed a series of component phases through which human volition—θέλησις, 
understood in its native, natural sense as appetitive movement of the soul—translated 
into concrete action.6 The will transitions from “wish” (βούλησις), expressing an 
appetite that is both rational and imaginative of those ends that are either within our 
power (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) or not; to the clustered phases of “inquiry” (ζήτησις), “consideration” 
(σκέψις), and “deliberation” (βουλή or βούλησις), where the reasoning soul, induced 
by an innate desire or appetite, scopes out a projected end; then to the phase of 
“judgment” (κρίσις), where reason determines the appropriate means to an end. At 
this point in the sequence, John Damascene inserts γνώμη, “inclination,” which 
Maximus had already defined both as the “deep-seated appetency” (ὄρεξις ἐνδιάθετος) 
from which arises “choice” or else as a “disposition” (διάθεσις) toward ends within 
our power, on which we have “appetitively deliberated.” The next phase is climactic 
both for Maximus and John: “choice” or “decision” (προαίρεσις) itself, the ultimate 
composite of antecedent appetite, deliberation, and judgment, committing the soul 
to a course of action (a means to an end). The last two volitional phases, concomitant 
with προαίρεσις, are “impulsion” (ὁρμή), the overall urge which, with the mind’s 
consent, moves the soul from wish, through choice, to action; and finally “use” 
(χρῆσις), the executed action itself, “using” the things that have been the objects of 
our internal thoughts, thus completing moral ownership of one’s choice and deed.
What concerns us is the climactic moment of choice (προαίρεσις) itself 
and more specifically the deep internal relation that Maximus and John establish 
3  Disp. c. Pyrrho (PG 91:312B-C); cf. John of Damascus, De fide orth. 3.14 (PG 94:1045B).
4  See the detailed analysis of R.-A. Gauthier, “Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de 
l’acte humaine,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 21 (1954): 51-100.
5  De fide orth. 2.22 (PG 94:944C-945B).
6  In what follows I am referencing Maximus, Opus. theol. et pol. 1, PG 91:12C-16C; Disp. 
c. Pyrrho, PhG 91: 293B-C); and John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa 2.22 (PG 94:944A-945C). For 
detailed analyses, see Gauthier; also Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthro-
pology of Maximus the Confessor, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 218-30; Jean-Claude Larchet, 
La divinization de l’ homme selon Maxime le Confesseur (Paris: Cerf, 1996), 135-41; Joseph Farrell, Free 
Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor (South Canaan, PΑ: St. Tikhonp.’s Seminary Press, 1989), 95-109. 
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between γνώμη and προαίρεσις as expressing the crux of human free will in both its 
appetitive and rational dimensions. At one point Maximus even equates “prohairetic” 
(προαιρετικόν) and “gnomic” (γνωμικόν) will.7 In earlier works pre-dating his deep 
involvement in the Monothelite controversy, Maximus had thoroughly exploited the 
meaning of γνώμη, depicting it as the particular or hypostatic freedom of individual 
creatures in their voluntary motion toward God. On the one hand, there is in the 
cosmos the “structural” or teleological motion (κίνησις) of created beings toward the 
Creator’s stability, manifested in souls’ natural desire for God and the “natural will” 
belonging to all created natures. On the other hand, there is that active appropriation 
of freedom, what we learn or know experientially as freedom, the very freedom which, 
though stunted by the fall,8 has been renewed through baptism9 and comes to fruition 
in virtuous choices. Γνώμη is the latter: our “willing surrender” (ἐκχώρησις γνωμική) 
to God’s activity in us,10 the conforming of our inclinations and choices, by grace, 
to the “natural will” that is already predisposed toward God.11 The very purpose of 
the incarnation, argues Maximus at one point, is to draw human γνώμη, together 
with all of human nature, to Christ and his deifying love,12 such that the ultimate, 
transfigured state of the cosmos would be characterized by no “gnomic” variance 
within the universe of individual created beings.13 
The upshot is that γνώμη, as freedom formed and leavened by experience 
in the face of the consequences of the fall, plays an enormous role in Maximus’ 
doctrine of the spiritual progress of the Christian.14 Indeed, the Christian is called 
to a “divine and angelic γνώμη,” as Maximus indicates in his Chapters on Love,15 and 
eschatologically to a “gnomic and prohairetic transformation,” as he projects in his 
Commentary on Psalm 59.16 
What further amplifies this portrait of gnomic will is precisely the 
christological application of it that Maximus would later retract, with John again 
7  Opus. theol. et pol. 1 (PG 91: 28D). See also Demetrios Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ: 
Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of St. Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 148-9.
8  On the pejorative meaning of γνώμη in connection with the fall, see e.g. Ad Thal. 21 (CCSG 
7:127-9); ibid. 42 (CCSG 22:285); ibid. 61 (CCSG 22:89); Or. dom. (CCSG 23:55, 69); Amb. 4 (PG 
91:1044A). 
9  Ad Thal. 6 (CCSG 7:69-71). Cf. John of Damascus, De duabus vol. (PG 95:180B).
10  Amb. 7 (PG 91:1076B), trans. Paul M. Blowers and Robert L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery 
of Jesus Christ: Selected Writings from St. Maximus the Confessor (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Semi-
nary Press, 2003), 52.
11  Or. dom. (CCSG 23:61). Cf. Philipp Gabriel Renczes, Agir de Dieu et liberté de l’ homme: 
Recherches sur l’anthropologie théologique de saint Maxime le Confesseur (Paris: Cerf, 276-7): “Le γνώμη 
est donc l’instance dont l’homme dispose afin de contribuer volontairement à ce que son movement se 
direge, avec la grace de Dieu, vers son but divin, la divinization…” (p. 276).
12  Ep. 2 (PG 91: 396C, 404C); cf. Cap. car. 1.71 (PG 90:976B-C) on how ἀγάπη reconciles the 
individuated γνῶμαι of creatures. 
13  Ad Thal. 2 (CCSG 7:51). 
14  Cap. car. 3.25 (PG 90:1024B-C); 4.90 (1069C); Lib. Asceticus (PG 90:953B); Amb. 10 (PG 
91:1116B); ibid. 7 (1073C); Ad Thal. 64 (CCSG 22:233); Opus. theol. et pol. 4 (PG (91:57A-B) See also 
John Meyendorff, “Free Will in Saint Maximus,” in Andrew Blane, ed., The Ecumenical World of Ortho-
dox Civilization (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1974), 74-5. 
15  Cap. car. 3.80 (PG 90:1141Β).
16  Exp. in Ps. 59 (CCSG 23:3).
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following his lead. Maximus in some of his earlier works had openly attributed 
γνώμη (and προαίρεσις as well) to Christ. Most strikingly in his Commentary on the 
Lord’s Prayer, he ascribed γνώμη to Christ in expounding how the Savior restored 
human nature to itself in the context of the Passion. Specifically, Christ’s gnomic 
will demonstrated no vacillation at the prospect of the cross, only the pure resolve 
that effectively conquered the natural fear of death by “using” that fear virtuously.17 
Maximus depicts Christ as the utterly unique model in which γνώμη and προαίρεσις18 
are already incorruptible and thoroughly conformed to the natural desire and natural 
will. In him all the stages of deliberation and choice noted above are operative in 
perfection.
Maximus’ “great reversal,” however, began in the Monothelite controversy 
in the 640s, when, having tolerated the different nuances of gnomic will, he settled 
on the exclusively pejorative definition of it as the fallen and ambivalent will which 
could not possibly have been functioning in Christ’s composite hypostasis. The 
reversal was gradual. As late as 642 Maximus was still ostensibly contemplating a 
perfected γνώμη in Jesus, but by the mid-640s he had definitely excluded it, both 
in his Opuscula and in his Disputation with Pyrrhus. We are helped here by the 
excellent recent monograph on Maximus’ Christology by Demetrios Bathrellos, 
which outlines the fuller reasons for his reversal, and confirms the fairly broad 
scholarly consensus of which I spoke earlier.19 Capital in Maximus’ mind is the fact 
that γνώμη is a particularized “mode” of willing,20 grounded in an individual human 
hypostasis. In Christ, however, there is no such hypostasis; there is only his composite 
hypostasis, the hypostasis of the divine Son perfectly united to Jesus’ humanity, 
within which “particularized” human choices and acts come about solely through 
his natural human will (θέλημα φυσική), which is completely deified.21 Maximus 
illustrates this with respect to a cherished biblical text, the account of Jesus’ prayer 
in Gethsemane, to which he repeatedly turned during the Monothelite controversy. 
The deified natural will, not γνώμη, is the subject of the “Agony” prayer and the agent 
of concurrence with the will of the Father. This deified will alone, in its capacity to 
stabilize “natural” human passions and instincts, can help us with our human fear of 
death, not a Savior who gnomically “deliberates” or calculates, and who is liable to 
lack resolve and to shrink from the “cup” of suffering that is handed him.
Fair enough. As Maximus makes clear, he is trying to avoid resurrecting a 
“Nestorian” Christ, a “mere man” (ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος), a human hypostasis united 
to God only through γνώμη. But here is the rub—and I am certainly not the first 
to point it out. Does this reversal in his Christology, this denial of γνώμη in Christ, 
do justice to the drama of Gethsemane? If, as Maximus indicates, the Christ of 
the Passion has, in volunteering himself to die, “used” fear itself in a new mode 
(τρόπος),22 redeeming those “natural” passions that are intrinsic to human beings and 
17  Disp. c. Pyrrho (PG 91:297B); cf. also Or. dom. (CCSG 23:34-5); Opus. theol. et pol. 7 (PG 
91:80D).
18  Cf. Ad Thal. 21 (CCSG 7:129-33); ibid. 42 (285). 
19  Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, 148-62.
20  Disp. c. Pyrrho (PG 91:308D). 
21  Cf. Opus. theol. et pol. 7 (PG 91:80D-81D); ibid. 3 (45B-49A).     . 
22  Disp. c. Pyrrho (PG 91:297D-300A). 
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a part of their deep-seated inclinations and aversions, can he do so without himself 
experiencing the vacillation informed by the love of life and fear of death? And on a 
grander scale, can a Christ without γνώμη truly redeem the tragically individuated 
γνῶμαι of created beings and thus achieve the “gnomic” reconciliation that Maximus 
earlier projects as a universal goal? 
Lars Thunberg plays down the problem, suggesting that the perfected γνώμη 
of Christ in Maximus’ earlier works approximates Christ’s deified natural will in his 
later anti-Monothelite compositions. By contrast, Raymund Schwager, in his prolific 
study of the development of Christian understandings of atonement, Der wunderbare 
Tausch, sees Maximus’ denial of γνώμη in Christ as the critically tragic flaw in the 
Confessor’s whole soteriology. If “what is not assumed in not healed,” how can Christ 
redeem the individuated γνῶμαι of sinners, the “deliberative” process that informs 
free choice in each one?23 Other scholars, like Basil Studer, simply assume that this 
is a dilemma that Maximus has calculatedly chosen to leave hanging because of the 
higher stakes of christological orthodoxy.24 
At last I have looked to John of Damascus as a possible aid in resolving 
this problem. The question, however, is whether John clarifies the matter or simply 
adds to the semantic confusion. As I have already noted, John follows Maximus 
very closely in virtually every consideration of the nature of human willing and 
the structure of volition in Christ. In two passages in his treatise On the Orthodox 
Faith, one of which directly depends on Maximus’ Disputation with Pyrrhus, John 
echoes Maximus’ categorical denial of gnomic will (τὸ γνωμικὸν θέλημα) in Christ 
and reaffirms the perfect deification of his natural human will by the divine will.25 
In the first of these passages, however, John seems to equivocate. Having just denied 
gnomic will in Christ, he defers to the fact that within the Trinity, nevertheless, there 
is one γνώμη, rooted in each of the three divine hypostases, but without variance 
of inclination with respect to the object of their willing. John in turn applies this 
principle christologically. If γνώμη can be understood narrowly in terms of being 
disposed toward a common end or object willed (τὸ θελητόν), it is possible to redeem 
the presence of a gnomic will shared by the two natural wills, divine and human, 
within Christ’s composite hypostasis.26 
In his recent monograph on the Damascene, Andrew Louth notes the 
possible confusion here, but simply claims that John is reinforcing Maximus’ 
distinction between natural and gnomic will in Christ.27 In my judgment, however, 
John’s apparent “reversal” is astonishing in its own right, for, in the spirit of Maximus’ 
recognition of the ambiguity of γνώμη, John refuses Maximus’ ultimate denial of its 
christological redeemability and once again exploits that semantic ambiguity for the 
23  Der wunderbare Tausch: Zur Geschichte und Deutung der Erlösungslehre (Munich: Kösel, 
1986), 141-7.
24  See Basil Studer, “Zur Soteriologie des Maximus,” in Felix Heinzer and Christoph Schön-
born, eds., Maximus Confessor: Actes du symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 
1980 (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1982), 245-6.
25  De fide orth. 2.22 (PG 94:948A); ibid. 3.14 (1044B-C). 
26  Ibid. 2.22 (PG 94:948B-C). 
27  Andrew Louth, St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139.
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sake of enriching the understanding of Christ’s volition. In an age when, as Averil 
Cameron has argued, terminological precision is everything,28 this is enormously 
risky. Undoubtedly John, however, did not see himself dissenting from Maximus. To 
equate γνώμη with the willed objective of Christ’s composite hypostasis is basically 
in sync with Maximus’ own assertion, citing Cyril of Alexandria, that in the agony 
of Gethsemane Christ showed that he willed the same thing—τὸ θελητόν—as 
the Father.29 In his third Opusculum, moreover, Maximus captured the same idea 
deferring to the scriptural terminology whereby Christ demonstrated the Father’s 
βουλή, or ultimate purpose (Eph. 1:11; cf. Acts 2:23).30
Further on in his treatise, John reopens the discussion on γνώμη. His 
conservatism persists, for “literally,” he says, we must deny γνώμη in Christ in the 
sense of deliberating on the good. Yet he once again states, this time in negative 
terms, the oneness of γνώμη between Christ’s human and divine wills within the 
composite hypostasis: “…it was not in γνώμη that the Lord’s two wills differed from 
each other, but in natural power.”31 Stated positively, their γνώμη—as a commonly 
willed objective (τὸ θελητόν)—was one and the same. 
In the passage immediately following, John reiterates Maximus’ positive 
evaluation of Ps-Dionysius the Areopagite’s famous principle of the “new theandric 
energy” in Christ.32 Appropriately nuanced, because ἐνέργεια is a function of nature, 
there cannot technically be one ἐνέργεια in Christ, but there is a new “monadic 
mode” (μοναδικὸς τρόπος) in which the deified human ἐνέργεια is utterly at one with 
the divine ἐνέργεια. 33 John then simply transfers this principle from the level of the 
natures/energies to that of the hypostasis itself. Christ’s composite person has one 
willed objective, one γνώμη. Even if John has opted to preserve this troubled term in 
a highly restrictive sense, no other term could better convey the mystery by which 
the divine freedom had infused and “liberated” human freedom in Christ. Even if 
there is no process of calculation, no forming of an opinion about the good, there is in 
Christ’s person something of a sublime “process” in which the divine will shapes and 
forms the human will so as to perform an individual human’s actions to a common 
purpose in the economy of salvation and deification.34 John, it seems, is ultimately 
more willing than Maximus to tolerate some ambiguity and risk some confusion for 
the sake of a new clarity. Since he lived at a far greater historical remove from the heat 
28  See her learned essays “Models of the Past in the Late Sixth Century: The Life of the 
Patriarch Eutychius;” “Disputations, Polemical Literature and the Formation of Opinion in the Early 
Byzantine Period;” and “Byzantium and the Past in the Seventh Century: The Search for Redefinition,” 
all reprinted in her Changing Cultures in Early Byzantium, Variorum Collected Studies 536 (Aldershot, 
U.K. and Brookfield, VT.: Variorum, 1996).
29  Maximus, Opus. theol. et pol. 15 (PG 91: 165A), citing Cyril Alex., Comm. in Joannem 
(frag.).
30  Opus. theol. et pol. 3 (PG 91:48B-C).
31  John, De fide orth. 3.18 (PG 94:1076D). 
32  Ps-Dionysius, Ep. 4 (PTS 36:161); Maximus, Amb. 5 (CCSG 48:29-34). 
33  Maximus, Amb. 5 (PG 91:1045D-1060D, and esp. 1052A-D).
34  Maximus, Opus. theol. et pol. 7 (PG 91:80D). See Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, 148-53; 
cf. Vladimir Lossky, An Introduction to Orthodox Theology (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press), 107, who argues that Maximus himself believed still in “gnomic” will in Christ solely as the pres-
ence of the divine freedom “kenotically” operative within him. The statement may better be applied to 
John! 
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of the Monothelite Controversy, we can understand the Damascene’s confidence in 
arguing this way.
Returning, however, to my original dilemma—the absence from Christ 
of what we would normally acknowledge as “gnomic will,” i.e. the appetitive and 
decision-making process known to human beings in their fallen state, John of 
Damascus really provides no resolution. He seems to concur with Maximus in 
projecting that ultimately only the deified natural human will of Christ provides the 
model by which individuated gnomic wills of fallen creatures will be restored and 
deified, only with the added nuance that their reconciliation will entail conformity to 
that γνώμη which is the resolute purpose of Christ’s composite person. Even if John 
ultimately errs on Maximus’ side, however, he presents us with a fascinating exercise 
in reopening the discussion of the highly contentious christological vocabulary that 
descended from the Monothelite Controversy.
